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Abstract
A dynamic model of time allocation decisions between work, child care 
and search activities upon a first birth is analyzed using a non-stationary 
dynamic programming model. Using backward recursion methods, I es­
timate a model which incorporates the following sequence of decisions, 
whether to stop working or not, whether to give up tenure, when to un­
dertake search activities (for those who give up tenure) and the setting 
of the optimal reservation wage. The model is non-stationary; the value 
of specializing in child care activities and search costs are age specific, 
those who give up tenure must absorb a human capital loss and offer 
probabilities are also duration dependent. The role of maternity benefits 
is also investigated. Overall, the model is able to explain the relatively 
large fraction of women who do not interrupt careers upon a first birth 
as well as the rapidly declining re-employment hazards.
'T he author would like to thank the European University Institute (San Domenico di 






















































































































































































Economic models concerned with fertility and the allocation of time within 
households have a long history in labor economics. For several decades, economists 
have tried to measure the impact of children on female labour supply. In the 
branch of the literature devoted to labour supply (surveyed in Nakamura and 
Nakamura, 1993), it is generally accepted that young children reduce both the 
participation probability and hours worked. Another branch of the literature 
is devoted to the effects of children on human capital accumulation. Following 
Mincer and Polachek (1974), authors have explained the gender wage gap by 
the fact that females have comparative advantages in household production and 
therefore tend to invest less in labour market oriented human capital.
Despite the large amount of work devoted to the estimation of labour 
supply functions or to the estimation of female earnings equations, very few 
authors have actually implemented structural dynamic/stochastic models char­
acterizing the optimizing behaviour of females who give birth. Among the few 
exceptions are Hotz and Miller (1988), who have estimated a model of fertility 
and contraceptive choices and Wolpin (1984), who has implemented a dynamic 
model where the sequence of decisions made is to have a child or not. However, 
the decision to return to work upon a first birth has not yet been analyzed using 
dynamic programming principles.
The main objective of this paper is to estimate structural dynamic pro­
gramming model which can describe accurately the sequence of discrete choices 
made by females upon a first birth. The model incorporates a sequence of four 
decisions; the decision to interrupt work or not (for those who are working), the 
decision to return to their previous job or not (the decision to give up tenure 
or not), the decision to initiate search activities and, for those who search, the 
setting of the optimal reservation wage. Various sources of non-stationarity are 
considered; the value of household activities in the presence of young children 
is allowed to be age-specific (household production when children are at school 
must be much lower than what it is in the initial years following birth) and the 
opportunity cost of search activities is higher in presence of young children, the 
decision to give up tenure implies that new wage offers must be drawn from the 
same distribution faced when the woman entered the labor market and I con­
sider the case where the probability of receiving job offers conditional on search 
can vary (decline) as the period devoted to household activities progresses. In 
a version of the model, I allow women to receive maternity benefits for a finite 




























































































I implement the model on a sample of Canadian women extracted from 
the Canadian Fertility Survey (CFS) conducted in 1984. The model allows me 
to estimate the age specific value of non-market time in the presence of young 
children and the effect of marital status (or partner’s income) on home produc­
tivity. I also pay a particular attention to the decision to interrupt employment 
or not upon a first birth and to the optimal investment in search activities. 
The model is able to predict a very high fraction of females who experience 
continuous employment spells despite child birth as well as rapidly declining 
re-employment hazards. Structural parameters imply that home productivity 
falls sharply after 4 years (home productivity seem to decline by an average 
between 6% and 10% per year) and that job opportunities are declining with 
elapsed non-employment spell lengths.
The paper is constructed as follows. In the following section (Section 2),
1 present the Canadian Fertility Survey and discuss some of the empirical facts 
to be explained. In section 3, I discuss the non-stationary dynamic program­
ming model which I use to analyze the data, while Section 4 is devoted to 
the econometric specification of the data and the construction of the likelihood 
function. The empirical results are discussed in Section 5 while the conclusion 
is in Section 6.
2 The Canadian Fertility Survey
The Canadian Fertility survey was conducted in April and May of 1984 . The 
survey incorporates retrospective information on 5315 women who were be­
tween 18 and 50 years old as of January 1st 1984. The survey includes women 
residing in either one of all ten Canadian provinces but 62% of all respondents 
resided in either Quebec or Ontario.1 The Canadian Fertility Survey (CFS) 
is quite comprehensive. It incorporates questions about timing of births and 
pregnancies, marriage (s), education and work histories (timing of interruptions 
and re-entrance in the labor market). The respondents are also asked some
'The Canadian Fertility survey (CFS) was funded by the Social Sciences and Humanities 
Research Council. It is the first national fertility survey conducted in Canada. The survey 
is quite similar to the data set on Swedish women fertility behavior used by Heckman and 
Walker (1990). The CFS was actually generated from a bank of 14,239,721 phone numbers 
from which 22,169 numbers have initially been randomly chosen. This process resulted in 




























































































questions on their attitudes toward marriage, divorce, contraception, abortion, 
family values and the frequency at which they participate in religious activities.
The survey has information on the number of different past employment 
spells and employment interruptions as well as their duration in months2. In 
the CFS, earnings are observed twice; when a woman first entered in the labor 
force and at the survey time for those women who actually held employment 
at that time. For those women who were out of the labor force by the survey 
time, earnings at the completion of the last employment spell are also reported.
The occupation breakdown of the women used in our sample is as follows. 
A large majority of women (57%) reported to be employees while 10% are in 
technical occupations (including nurses) and 8% are teachers. Approximately 
6% report working in supervising jobs while 6% work in managerial positions 
and 7% in professional occupations. The remaining 7% are laborers or are in 
occupations unclassified according to the Canadian Dictionary of Occupations.
In this paper, I work with a relatively small sample. First, I restrict the 
analysis to women who have given one birth and do not wish (or cannot have) 
anymore children.3 This allows me to formulate a model where the number of 
options is tractable; work at home (household production), work in the labor 
market and search activities (needed for them who have stopped working long 
enough). Although the sample contains women who have given birth prior to la­
bor market entrance (some women are actually not working at the birth of their 
first child), women who have worked part-time at first birth or subsequently (less 
than 30 hours per week) have not been included. In order to capture the fact 
that an interruption for fertility must designate a non-participation spell during 
which women are involved in child care activities (instead of participating in 
the labor market), I must use a definition flexible enough to include women 
who leave after the birth or sometime before the birth. In the case where a 
woman interrupt before the birth, I do not face serious problems. I impose that 
the recorded interruption must have taken place no more than 9 (nine) months 
prior to the actual birth. For those who report stopping work after 1st birth, I 
retain only those who stopped working no later than one moth after the birth 
of the first child.4 These criteria, along with the elimination of women with
2 A duration analysis of non-employment spell durations and incidence is performed in 
Belzil and Hergel (1995).
3In the CFS, women are. actually asked whether or not they expect anymore children in 
the future.
4This can probably be explained by the fact that some women have vacation entitlements 




























































































missing information for either education, marital status at child’s birth, earn­
ings and the reported individual value of having children, reduced the sample 
to 206 women.5
In Tablet A, I report the empirical frequencies of women returning to work 
within 1 up to 8 years. I have split the sample according to two classifications; 
those women with more than 12 years of education and less than 12 years and 
those women who were working at the time of the first birth and those who 
were not. In Table IB, I report some sample statistics. Empirical hazards for 
the full sample (computed per quarters) can be found in Figure 1.
Overall, the data indicate that a very large proportion of women return to 
work within a year (around 50%). This is true for both low and high education 
women. Not surprisingly, the fraction of women working at the time of (or 9 
months before) birth who are back within a year is even larger. Although very 
few of the women not working at birth are actually will actually be working 
within one year following birth (only 14%), it is still interesting to note that 
more than half of those will be working within 5 years following a first birth. The 
empirical hazards (computed for each quarter) for the entire sample reveal a very 
interesting pattern (Figure 1). Around 37% of the women return to work within 
3 months and therefore experience virtually continuous employment patterns 
despite birth. In the next two quarters, re-employment hazards axe low but they 
raise significantly in the last three months of the first year (from 3% to 12%). 
These spikes in the first and fourth quarters suggest that women who return to 
work within a year probably have the option of returning to their previous work 
but can only preserve this option for a finite period. Furthermore, the payment 
of maternity benefits within the Canadian Unemployment Insurance system can 
also explain the sudden rise in re-employment rates around the time when the 
child turns one year old. Finally, the empirical hazards (Figure 1) show a very 
strong decline in the re-employment rates during the first two years and a slight 
increase in the following years, most probably caused by the drop in the value 
of non-market time when children reach schooling age. The sample statistics in 
Table IB indicate that most women who gave birth were actually married when 
they gave birth and that there is only very little difference in work experience
short period following first birth. Related issues are discussed in Belzil and Hergel (1995).
5ln the CFS, women are actually asked several questions about individual and moral 
values. In particular, they are asked whether they believe that ” to be generally happy in life, 
individuals should have at least one child”. This variable is going to be used as a proxy for 
individual heterogeneity in the taste (or value) of having children. Women have also been 





























































































accumulation between low and high education women.6
Table lA -Fraction o f W omen Returning to Work
High Low Working Not Working
Education Education at Birth at Birth
Within 1 year .54 .44 .60 .14
Within 2 years .59 .57 .67 .29
Within 3 years .66 .63 .74 .35
Within 4 years .71 .69 .78 .45
Within 5 years .77 .72 .81 .53
Within 6 years .82 .78 .86 .63
Within 7 years .86 .84 .90 .71
Within 8 years .91 .86 .92 .78
#  of observations 95 111 155 51
Table IB -Sam ple statistics7
High Low Working Not Working
Education Education at Birth at Birth
Age at survey 33.3 30.9 32.3 31.7
Experience at 1st birth (months) 51.7 50.6 67.9 -
Earnings at First Job .324 .334 .381 -
Fraction Married at 1st birth .96 .90 .95 .86
Education (years) 15.0 11.5 13.1 12.7
Husband’s Earnings .522 .479 .541 .372
#  of observations 95 111 155 51
sAlthough there is a very small number of lone mothers in my sample, there is evidence 
that single women tend to return faster. However, because of the large number of empty cells, 
I do not present the married/single distinction in Table IB.
7A11 earnings are measured in thousands of Canadian dollars per week divided by the 
consumer price index.Earnings at first job refers to the first full-time job held before the birth 
























































































































































































3 An Estim able Dynam ic programming M odel
In this paper, I consider the sequence of discrete choices between labor market 
work or household production for those who have given birth. The decision to 
give birth is therefore ignored and women who gave birth can either continue 
work (or perhaps start working) or stop working in the initial period. I assume 
that those who do not work in the labor market are involved in child care 
activities but have the option of returning to their job within a certain period. 
Those who abandon the option on their previous job (those who give up tenure) 
must choose sequentially whether it is optimal to come back to work (which 
requires search investment) or to remain at home and be involved in child care 
activities.
A ssum ption 1
Women maximize the present value of lifetime output over an infinite 
horizon which starts at the time of a first birth. The productivity in the labor 
market is given by the wage, w(, while the value of specializing in child care 
activities (home production), 'J'(t), is age specific and is such that
$(t) > 0 for 0 < t < t,
= i) for t > t ,
where t is children’s age and t can be interpreted as the time at which 
children start full time schooling. I assume that it is impossible to work in the 
labor market and at home within a same period.
A ssum ption 2
At t : 0 < t < t ,
•  w< =  w0 with probability 1.





























































































A ssum ption 3
• At t : t < t < t,
The probability of receiving one offer, 6(t), is non-increasing in t. 
Assum ption 4
• At t : t > t ,
m = 8d)
Assum ption 5
• At t : t > t, potential wages are distributed with density f(w) given by
f(w) =  Xexp(-Xw)
Assum ption 6
• Wage offers accepted upon birth (whether the previous job or a new job) 
cannot grow.8
A ssum ption 7
Search is assumed to be time consuming. The opportunity cost of search 
activities, c(t), is expressed as a fraction of the home productivity. As the 
decision in period 0 is only between continue working at wage w0 and stop 
working (and involve in child care activities), search is assumed only possible
8This assumption can be interpreted as the cost of bearing children and implies that the 




























































































from period t onward. I assume that search requires 50% of the time endowment, 
that is
At t : t > t,
• c(t) =  .5.$(t).
Assumption 1 ,4,5,6 and 7 allow me to solve the problem in closed form in 
period t so that backward recursions can be used to obtain a solution in period 
0. Assumption 2 is made in order to take into account that many employers 
rehire women who have stopped working for a short period while assumption 3 
takes into account that females who stayed out for a relatively long period might 
be not very attractive to prospective employers. Altogether, they imply that, 
beyond t, each woman faces a stationary environment. Finally, assumption 6 
is made in order to incorporate a physical or a psychological cost of bearing 
children.9
As it is usually the case in non-stationary dynamic programming prob­
lems, the solution can be characterized easily using backward recursion meth­
ods. First, as noted earlier (assumption 6), the value of accepting employment 
(either previous job or a new job) with wage w at time t, V((to), is independent 
from t and is simply given by
Vt'{w) =  V'(w) =  ^  (1)
It can be noted that the value of specializing in child care activities (not 
to search) at a given period t, (V(), has the following form.
V*-o =  V? =  *(i) +  0E{Vl+1 | st =  0} (2)
while the value of search, Vf, is given by
V„ml =  V’ = 9{t) -  c(t) +  0E{Vt+1 | a, =  1} (3)
where
9There is indeed empirical evidence that female wages tend to grow less than wages of 
males and that the gender wage gap is much smaller in the immediate years following labor 




























































































EVt+\ = Max{- (1 -  e(+17 r « +1))w(*+1 +  Ol+17r(u?t*+1)(tut*+1 +  - ) ,EVt'+1}
(4)
and represents the value of following the optimal policy next period; either 
search (in square brackets) or child care activities (EV(+1). The expectation is 
taken with respect to f(w). At t onward, the optimization becomes stationary 
so the solution can be characterized easily. Given that non-market time has 
value $ at and beyond t, two cases are possible
i) It is optimal to search:
V[=Vf = *( i ) -c ( t )  + 0EVi+l
where
EVt =  EVi+1 = ... = —
The reservation wage, denoted w*, is such that




ui =  tf+ i =  =  *(t) -  c(t) + exp( ~AM*)=
.5i? +  j i  y  ^  exp(-Aw')
so
(7)
^  = r b  l*(i) “ + j r b y d- f  exp(- Aw*} =
Case ii) It is optimal to drop out permanently from the labor market:
The value of not searching (and dropping out of the labour force perma­






























































































1 - 0 (9)
So the optimal choice between V, and Vc (in period t) is obtained by 
comparing (3.7) and (3.8).
In period t-s (where s= l, 2,_t ), the value of search and the value of
specializing in child care activities are given respectively by
V-;_, =  9 (t - S ) -  C(i - s )  + 0EV-t_,+, (10)
Vf_, = * ( i - s )  + 0EVi_,+1 ( 11)
where
EV-t_,+l =  M a x { j ^  [(1 -  0t_J+17r(u7tJ_j+j))u)t;_j+1 +  ^ _ » n » (w ^ +I)(ti)*_J+1 + {
E (*-t_a+1 + PEVi_,+2)}
and where the first line of 3.11 represents the expected value of searching 
next period if it is optimal to do so while the second represents the value of 
opting out from labour force next period to specialize in household activities.
Clearly, at t-s, the optimal reservation wage must solve the following equa­
tion
Wf
^  =  * (t -  s) -  c(t - s )  + 0EVi_s+1 (12)
That is the reservation wage in t-s must equal the value of rejecting an 
offer (tf-c) plus the expected value (properly discounted) of choosing the opti­
mal strategy next period (including the possibility of specializing in child care 
activities). This must be true until period t+1 (the first period when search 
is available). At t, the decision is made between returning to previous job and 
investing in child care activities. Working backward until the initial period (pe­
riod 0), each woman has the possibility of remaining employed (at wage w0) 




























































































employed in t=0 (which is the condition to experience continuous employment 
despite first birth) is actually given by
> * (0 )+ 0 E V {1) (13)
4 Econom etric Specification
The model presented in the previous section implies that at each period, the de­
cision between working in the labour market, specializing in child care activities 
and investing in search activities, is made conditional on the values of the pa­
rameters of the model. Those individuals facing same parameters will undertake 
search activities or specialize in child care activities in the same periods and 
the dispersion in the time at which women are observed to re-enter the labor 
force could therefore be explained solely by the intrinsic randomness imbedded 
in search activities. This representation of the choices made by women would 
clearly be at odd with actual data which shows a relatively large dispersion in 
the timing of re-employment. For this reason, I must specify a model which 
can allow individuals with identical observed characteristics to choose different 
options. However, in order to use the restrictions implied by job search theory 
(the contraction mapping given by equation 7), I want to preserve the terminal 
conditions (when the problem becomes purely stationary) which allow me to 
identify the structural parameters. For this reason, I assume that home pro­
ductivity is subject to random shocks, assumed independent over time, only for 
the period during which children require child care activities (before schooling). 
I assume that these shocks are known to the economic agent but unknown to 
the investigator.
A ssum ption 8
The value of specializing in child care activities, before t is given by
for 0< t < t. The random term eu represents all unobservable factors 
which can, in a given period, affect productivity at home (child or parents




























































































health...etc.) and is known by the optimizing agent but unknown to the econo­
metrician. Given this assumption,
At any period t — s, fors > 0,
V(t — s)-Vf_3 =  with probability l-$(
- .5 ^ ( t  — s) +  exp(—\w-_
(14)
—.b^(t -  s) +  ̂  ̂ exp(—Aicj_ )
V(t — s)=Vrls =  with probability 4>(--------------------- ------------------------- )
(15)
(16)
A ssum ption 9
V (t )  =  t? =  0.
This assumption, along with assumption 7 implies that, from t onward,
Vf  =  V  =  0 < V? =  V" =  exp(-Xw')
which means that, beyond t , it is always optimal to search because the 
value of household production is O.10
A ssum ption 10
For those women searching, at most one job offer is received per period. 
The probability of receiving one job offer is given by
10This implies that there is no value associated to leisure. Given that the overwhelming 




























































































Prob (wt > 0) =  $ (a t) for t > t
where $>(.) denotes the standard normal cdf.
A ssum ption 11
In order to estimate the model, I must specify a functional form for the 
value of non-market time in presence of children. I investigate two possible 
cases for ®(t).
i) First, I consider a case where the productivity at home is allowed to 
be age specific with no monotonicity restrictions and assume that the function 
\t(t) is given by
m  = exp(r(t) + X'0) (17)
where t denotes the age of a child, X is a vector which contains marital 
status at birth (replaced in some cases by husband’s income) and a binary 
variable (called fertility heterogeneity) equal to 1 for those women reporting 
that it is either very important or important to have children in order to be 
happy in life (see section 2) and 0 for those who did not . r(t) plays the role of 
an age specific intercept term and allows me to obtain a flexible representation 
of home productivity from the time of birth until school enrolment. This is 
referred to as model 1.
ii) To reduce the number of parameters, I also consider a case where 
I impose a monotonic relationship between home productivity and children’s 
age. In this case 'l'(t) is given by
'l'(t) =  exp(r +  X'0).uil (18)
where 'l'(t) is increasing (or decreasing) with age as u  is above (or below) 1.
Inspection of the optimal reservation wage equation (8) reveals that iden­
tification of the offer probability and the wage offer location parameter requires 
data on wages or earnings. However, in the CFS, earnings are measured once 
at the time a woman entered the labor force and once more at the survey time 
(for those employed in 1984) or when employed last. Accepted wages when a 




























































































to estimate the model consistently, I need am estimate of wages for those who 
were employed at first birth but have not yet been back to work and I also need 
an estimate of the wage offer distribution faced when a decision is made about 
initiating search activities.
A ssum ption 12
To obtain reasonable estimates, I assume that the distribution parameter 
of wages (A) earned at first birth is function of education and experience (in 
months), that is
A =  exp(Ao +  Ai. education +  A2.experience)
To make use of all observations efficiently, I estimate Ao and Ai from all 
206 observations on weekly earnings at labor market entrance (when experience 
is 0). In order to obtain an estimate for A2 I cannot use all the observations in 
my sample. This is because the second earnings for women who have been back 
in the labor market after having an interruption are likely to underestimate the 
effect of experience if, indeed, work interruption imply a human capital loss. 
Similarly, if I use only women who never came back in the labor market after 
stopping work, I am likely to incorporate women who experienced much longer 
non-employment spells than average. So, in order to estimate the effects of 
experience, I use a sample of women who had not yet experienced an interrup­
tion but who were 25 years old or less at the survey time (this a subset of the 
sample analyzed in Belzil and Hergel, 1995) so that women with continuous 
work patterns are not over-represented. After having fixed Ao and At to the 
values obtained previously with 206 observations, I can obtained an estimate 
for the effect of experience and I can use all three estimates in the solution of 
the value functions. More details can be found in Appendix 2. Finally, in order 
to estimate the model, I fix the discount factor at 5% per year.
Given the assumptions made, it is relatively easy to write the likelihood 
function. Although the model is characterized by a sequence of decisions be­
tween search and specializing in child care activities, actual data on the age of 
child at reentrance in the labor market can be used to make inference about 
the structural parameters. Defining a sequence of R, such that
R(t) — 1 if a woman came back to work in year t (19)




























































































Pr{Rt =  1) =  Pr(5( =  exp(-Aw*(t)) (20)
Pr{Rt =  0) =  Pr(St =  0). +  Pr(S£ =  1){1 -  0(f) exp(-Aw'{t))} (21)
while for all t < t
where the right hand side of (20) is the product of the probability that 
woman searched in year t and the probability that an acceptable offer has been 
received (accepted) while the right-hand side of (21) is the sum of the probability 
that a woman did not search and the probability that she search unsuccessfully 
(itself the probability that she searched times the probability that no acceptable 
offer has been received). Similarly, the right-hand side of (22) is the probability 
that the value of working for the wage earned at child birth’s (wo) exceeds to the 
value of child care activities while (23) is simply the probability of the converse. 
Note that (22) and (23), when evaluated in period 0, determine the probability 
that a woman will experience continuous employment spell despite child’s birth. 
The likelihood for a sample of N uncensored waiting time until return to work 
(Ti), L%) is given by
Pr {Rt =  1) =  P r($4(t) + e$ + (3EVl+1 < (22)
Pr (Rt = 0) =  Pr(# 4(t) + e t + pEVl+1 > A (23)
(24)
For those women who have not been back by the end of t, is quite easy, 
the likelihood, Lc, is simply
Maximizing the log likelihood requires that, at each iteration and for each 



























































































the structural parameters. The reservation wage at iteration p+1, w)(+, , is 
given by the following equation
K >
where h(w*) =  w’ — exp(—Au>*). This parameterization enables
me to obtain reservation wages which depend explicitly on exogenous variables 
(education, marital status and the intrinsic taste for children) without having 
to stratify my sample into smaller sub-samples. I can therefore make use of all 
observations in the sample.
5 Empirical Results
The empirical results are divided into three sections. In section 1 ,1 investigate 
the model where the productivity at home is allowed to depend on child’s age in 
a flexible way (Model 1) and the model where home productivity is depending 
monotonically on child’s age (Model 2). In the second section, I analyze two 
slightly different versions of model 1 and 2; one with husband’s income (model 
3) and one where I incorporate maternity benefits (model 4). Finally, in the 
third section, I consider a model with heterogeneity in taste for work using a 
question of the CFS (Model 5).
5.1 Investigating the Value o f Home Productivity
As a starting point, I have implemented both model 1 (with flexible age specific 
productivity at home) and model 2 (with a baseline productivity shifted by w‘). 
In order to facilitate estimation, I consider time periods of three months (quar­
ters). Both models are estimated under the assumption that home productivity 
drops to 0 (and becomes non stochastic) after year 5 and assuming that it is 
optimal to search (see assumption 9). Finally, I also assume that jobs held at 
birth can be reintegrated within 4 quarters so that those coming back to work 
beyond 4 quarters give up tenure and I fix the discount factor to 5% per year.
The results are in Table 2A. The estimates of model 1 have been obtained 
by imposing that home productivities remain constant over a 2 year period 
(except for period 0). I estimated 3 different productivities; one for period 




























































































intercept terms indicate that home productivity is virtually equal to 0 at the 
beginning of year 4 and that home productivity increase slightly from year 0- 
1 to year 2-3 while the estimate for uj in model of 2 (w = .94) indicates an 
overall decline in age specific home productivity of 6 % per year. As it can 
be found in Table 2A, model 2 imputes a much larger role to marital status 
in the determination of household productivity (the effect of marital status 
is 1.44 as opposed to .10 in model 1). In order to illustrate the age specific 
distribution of home productivity and the role of marital status as well as taste 
heterogeneity, I computed the predicted home productivities for the four classes 
of women in Table 2B (modell) and 2C for model 2. It can also be noted that, 
both in model 1 and model 2, those women reporting that having children is 
important to them tend to have lower home productivity (and will therefore be 
more likely to return to work early). Both model 1 and model 2 predict that job 
opportunities become more scarce as a woman remains absent from the labor 
market; the implied sequence of offer probabilities in model 1 is 1 (in yearl), 
.86 (in year 2 and year 3) and .45 (from year 4 onward) while the corresponding 
sequence in model 2 is given by 1, .81 and .18.
In Table 2D and 2E, I compute the sequence of reemployment hazards, 
Search hazards (conditional probability of initiating search in a given period) 
and reservation wages implied by the parameters obtained in 2A. Given the pa­
rameterization I used, I must select a given value of earnings at birth, education, 
marital status and taste heterogeneity. The values reported in 2D and 2E are 
those obtained for married women with 15 years of education (a relatively high 
level in the sample) who earned 324 dollars per week at first birth. As I have 
assumed that search was initiated only in year 1, the search hazards are only 
defined in year 1 (from the 5th quarter onward) and reservation wages reported 
for the first four quarters (in year 0) are wages equating the value of specializing 
in child care activities while those reported from year 1 are wages that equate 
the value of search (rejecting an offer). For both model 1 and model 2, I have 
included (in brackets) the empirical hazards for the group of married women 
who have 13 years or more of education.
Overall, the predicted reemployment hazards (for either model 1 or model 
2) can fit the data relatively well; we observe a very high probability of re­
turning to work within 3 months (which typically means no work interruption) 
followed by a steep decline in the reemployment hazards for both the second 
and third quarter and a very clear increase in the last quarter . This spike 
in reemployment before the end of the initial year of child bearing seems to 




























































































other possible explanations will be analyzed in the next section. From the sec­
ond year (year 1) onward, predicted hazards as well as empirical hazards are 
relatively low. The estimates for the probability of searching in a given quar­
ter conditional on no search in previous quarters (search hazards) indicate that 
search is typically initiated shortly after the child turns one year old and that 
the probability drops very rapidly. The sequence of reservation wages is also 
generally declining although, in model 1, reservations are increasing from the 
beginning of year 3 to reach a maximum of 126.72 at the beginning of period 
5 (to save spaces reservation wages , hazards are reported for the first 4 years 
(year 0,1,2 and 3). In model 2, home productivity is monotonically decreasing 
and reservation wages are uniformly decreasing.11 *12






Intercept (1-2) -.20 (0.04) -
Intercept (3-4) -8.7 (1.12) -
Intercept - -2.31 (0.72)
uj (age) - 0.94 (0.08)
Married .10 (0.65) 1.44 (0.78)
Heterogeneity -.009 (.006) -0.24 (0.08)
Variance (crj) 4.97 (0.56) 5.02 (0.43)
Offer Probabilities Year 2-3 $(1.08) $(0.87)
Year 4-oo $(-0,115) $(-0.90)
Log Likelihood -327.5 -366.7
"Indeed, in an intial version of the paper I have estimated a similar model where home 
productivities were flexibly estimated and where offer probabilities were fixed to one over the 
entire period. I obtained increasing reservation wages from year 2 up to the end of year 4; a 
result quite implausible.




























































































Table 2B- Values o f  Hom e P roductivity for M odel 1 (in dollars per 
week)
Year 0 Years 1-2 Years 3-4
Married/ heterogeneity=high 408.0 897.0 .20
Married/ heterogenity=low 413.0 905.0 .20
Single/heterogenity=high 370.0 811.0 .00
Single/ heterogeneity= low 374.0 819.0 .00
Table 2C-Values o f H om e Productivity for M odel 2 (in dollars per 
week)
Year 0 Year 1 Year2 Year 3 Year
Married/ hetero.=high 330 310 291 274 258
Married/ hetero=low 419 394 370 348 327
Single/hetero=high 78 73 69 65 61




























































































Table 2D - Reem ploym ent Hazards, Search Hazards and Reservation
W ages in M odel l 13
(1) (2) (3)
Reemp. Hazards Search Hazards Reser. Wages
Year 0 1 0.4921 (0.4105) . 328.94
2 0.2534 (0.0357) - 324.72
3 0.1307 (0.0185) - 315.62
4 0.0679 (0.1698) - 293.78
Yearl 1 0.0099 (0.0227) 0.4277 274.33
2 0.0081 (0.0697) 0.2448 261.70
3 0.0072 (0.0250) 0.1400 238.47
4 0.0064 (0.0000) 0.0802 214.03
Year 2 1 0.0047 (0.0256) 0.0459 188.30
2 0.0038 (0.0263) 0.0263 161.21
3 0.0037 (0.0270) 0.0113 132.69
4 0.0032 (0.1111) 0.0150 102.68
Year 3 1 0.0030 (0.0938) 0.0086 84.11
2 0.0020 (0.0000) 0.0058 88.53
3 0.0014 (0.0345) 0.0029 93.19
4 0.0009 (0.0000) 0.0014 98.08
13The numbers in brackets are the empirical hazards computed for married women who 




























































































Table 2E -R eem ploym ent hazards, Search Hazards and Reservation
W ages in M odel 2 14
(1)
Reemp. Hazards


































5.2 Partner’s Income and M aternity Benefits
Overall, although the model fits the data relatively well, it can be criticized for 
two main reasons. First, information on husband’s income is likely to be more 
useful than marital status in capturing heterogeneity in the value of non-market 
time. To resolve this issue, I reestimate model 2 where marital status is replaced 
by husband’s (or partner’s) earnings measured at the time of the survey. This 
becomes model 3. 14
14The numbers in brackets are the empirical hazards computed for married women with 13 




























































































Secondly, estimates for home productivity (Table 2B and 2C) seem rela­
tively high if one considers that the average earnings is only 330 but substantial 
number of women return to work within a year and , in particular, within 3 
months. A possible explanation is that the value of female market time is biased 
by the presence of unemployment income (maternity benefits). In Canada, since 
1973, females who stop working after a birth can draw UI benefit for a period 
which can go up to 40 weeks. Although the CFS does not provide information 
on maternity benefits, I can evaluate it using the product of the wage earned 
at birth and a replacement rate parameter to be estimated.15 For this matter, 
I redefine the value of non-market time in model 2 as
$(t) =  exp(r(f) +  X'0) +  a(t).W0 (25)
where a(t) is a positive parameter to be estimated. I assume that every indi­
viduals is entitled to maternity benefits for 4 quarters so that a  is set to 0 after 
one year. I refer to this specification as model 4.





























































































Table 3A- Structural Param eters in M odel 3 and M odel 4 16
Home Productivity
Intercept (0-1)
M odel 3 M odel 4
-1.263 (0.23)
Intercept (2-3) - -1.074 (0.37)
Intercept (4-5) - -2.618 (0.08)
Intercept -1.657 (0.70) -
Husband’s Income 0.7843 (0.06) -
Married - 0.312 (0.09)
Heterogeneity -0.083 (0.05) -0.023 (0.07)
u> (child’s age) 0.913 (0.27) -
Variance (dj) 4.39 (0.87) 4.78 (0.68)
Maternity Benefit (a) - .353 (0.29)
Offer Probabilities Year 2- 3 $(.53) $(.31)
Year 4- oo $(-.42) $(-1.36)
Log Likelihood -335.7 -311.9
Table 3B- Values for Hom e Productivity in M odel 4
Year 0 Year 1-2 Year 3-4
Married/ hetero=high 378 456 97
Married/ hetero=low 386 467 100
Single/hetero=high 276 334 71
Single/hetero=low 283 342 73




























































































Table 3C- R eem ploym ent Hazards, Search Hazards and Reservation
W ages in M odel 4.
(1) (2) (3)
Reemp. hazards Search hazards Reser.
Year 0 1 0.6012 _ 259.91
2 0.0818 .4697 239.39
3 0.0678 .2491 227.80
4 0.0555 .1321 215.60
Yearl 1 0.0433 .0691 210.79
2 0.0341 .0371 207.04
3 0.0270 .0199 199.71
4 0.0213 .0107 191.98
Year 2 1 0.0162 .0057 183.85
2 0.0124 .0031 175.29
3 0.0100 .0017 166.28
4 0.0077 .0009 156.79
Year 3 1 0.0062 .0005 155.88
2 0.0044 .0003 151.72
3 0.0031 .0001 155.88
4 0.0022 .0000 -160.27
The results for model 3 do not appear much different from model 2. How­
ever, the intercept term for the baseline productivity in year 0 has increased 
from -2.31 to -1.657. As a consequence, female productivities will have much 
higher spread. Again, there is evidence that home productivity is generally 
declining with age. In this case, productivity drop by 9% per year.
The most interesting results are probably those concerning model 4. The 
reduction of the period during which women have an option on their previ­
ous job couple with the introduction of maternity benefits has reduced the 
re-employment rates in quarter 2 and quarter 3 of the first year and has raised 
to re-employment hazards in year 1 (from quarter 5 to 8) to levels much more 
comparable with empirical hazards observed in the data. Interestingly, the es­




























































































is still an increase in yearl-2) and, in particular, the level of home productivity 
in year 3 and 4 is now between 70 and 100 dollars (while it was virtually 0 in 
model 1). The offer probabilities are 1, .70 and .34 for model 3 and 1, .62 and 
.09 for model 4.
5.3 Inclusion o f Taste for Work
The final modification analyzed in the paper is the introduction of a variable 
which takes into account that women might differ not only in terms of their 
taste for fertility but also in terms of taste for work outside the home. Again, I 
can make use of the information available in the CFS as women have actually 
been asked to say whether they attached high or low value to having a job 
outside the home. If I assume that a fraction t  of the population attaches a 
value & to work (the high value) and a fraction (1-t ) attaches value $  (the 
low value) where £( =0, then I can use the information contained in the answer 
given by each women about the value they attach to having a job to split the 
sample into two groups; those who reported having a very high or a high value 
of working outside the home and those who did not. Given this, value functions 
and reservation wages can be adjusted in a straightforward manner, the value 
of accepting employment is now given by
Ve{w) =
UJ +  f
and reservation wages must equate Ve(w) and the value of search Vs (equa­
tion 10 or equation 8). In order to analyze the model with taste for work, I 
keep the specification of model 4 (with maternity benefits and no job recall).
The structural parameters are in table 4A. As indicated by the obtained 
values for the intercept terms (home productivity), model 5 is the only model 
specification where the age specific home productivities are uniformly declining 
(when estimated flexibly). The estimates for home productivity (in Table 4B) 
are actually higher than those in Table 3B. Not surprisingly, the estimate for 
£ is positive ( 81). This means that women who report that working outside is 
very important attach a value of 81$ per week to holding a job when compared 
to the other type of women. The parameter estimate has however a very high 
standard error. The inclusion of £ (if positive) clearly reduces the reservation 
wage (and therefore the value of search) but raises the value of keeping the 




























































































reemployment hazards and reservation wages for those with the low level of 
taste for work (column 1 and 2) and those with a high level (column 3 and 4). 
Reservation wages for those who have a positive taste for work are uniformly 
lower than for those who do not. As expected, those with a taste for work are 
more likely to return to work within 3 months but the structural parameters 
do not imply a meaningful difference in the reemployment hazards. Finally, the 
introduction of two types of women who differ in terms of their taste for work 
has raised the offer probabilities somewhat. Previous models implied a much 
stronger decline in the probability of receiving an offer than model o.





Intercept (1-2) -1.112 (0.36)





ui (child’s age) -
Variance (<rj) 4.44 (0.76)
Maternity Benefit (a) .325 (0.27)
Offer Probabilities Year 2- 3 $(.92)
Year 4- oo $(.07)
Taste for Work £ (heterogeneity) 0.812 (.66)
Log Likelihood -306.2




























































































Table 4B- Values for Hom e Productivity in M odel 5
Year 0 Year 1-2 Year 3-4
Married/ hetero=high 445 391 153
Married/ hetero=low 463 407 159
Single/hetero=high 364 320 125
Single /hetero=low 379 333 130
Table 4C- Reem ploym ent Hazards and R eservation wages in M odel 
5
-1- -2- -3- -4-
Reemp. hazards Reser. Wages Reemp. Hazards Reser. Wages
£ =  6  =  o £ =  6  =  o £ = 6 .  =  .81 £ =  £k =  -81
Year 0 1 0.4887 331.11 0.5281 306.35
2 0.0827 288.96 0.0829 259.88
3 0.0754 264.50 0.0741 236.20
4 0.0680 238.76 0.0654 211.26
Year 1 1 0.0611 226.17 0.0575 199.73
2 0.0483 224.23 0.0445 198.36
3 0.0384 220.39 0.0345 195.67
4 0.0304 216.35 0.0267 192.83
Year 2 1 0.0233 212.09 0.0199 189.85
2 0.0185 207.62 0.0155 186.73
3 0.0147 202.90 0.0120 183.41
4 0.0156 197.94 0.0093 179.94
Year 3 1 0.0092 194.40 0.0073 180.54
2 0.0070 193.90 0.0054 181.89
3 0.0054 193.37 0.0041 183.31
4 0.0041 192.80 0.0031 184.81
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have used a non-stationary dynamic programming model to 




























































































has allowed me to obtain estimates for female productivity in presence of young 
children. Despite the very large fraction of women who return within a year 
(in particular within three months), the results indicate relatively large values 
for home productivity in the first three years but a quite important decline in 
subsequent years along with a relatively important decline on job opportunities. 
As a consequence, the value of holding a job in periods surrounding first birth 
are relatively high and, either a large fraction of the women in the sample either 
remain employed (or come back within three months) or initiate search activities 
within two years following child birth. The results also indicate that marital 
status at birth has an important impact (positive) on home productivity.
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A ppendix 1- Emprirical Hazards for the Full Sample
1st quarter 2nd quarter third quarter fourth Quarter
Year 0 0.3689 0.0462 0.0242 0.1240
Year 1 0.0849 0.0722 0.0111 0.0225
Year 2 0.0345 0.0357 0.0247 0.0759
Year 3 0.0822 0.0448 0.0156 0.0159
Year 4 0.0484 0.0678 0.0000 0.0364
Year 5 0.0187 0.0192 0.0980 0.1087
Year 6 0.0732 0.0789 0.0571 0.0606
Year 7 0.0968 0.0357 0.0741 0.0400
Year 8 0.0000 0.0000 0.0417 0.0000
A ppendix 2
E stim ation o f the Param eters o f the W age Offer D istribution
In order to estimate the parameters of the wage offer distribution, I pro­
ceed as follows.
1st Step
I split my original sample into 4 groups (high education/single, high edu- 
cation/married, low education/single and low education/married and I compute 




























































































reservation wage. As I can use only observations on wages earned when they en­
tered the labor market for those who have worked before birth, I have a smaller 
sample (155 women). The minimum wages are given in the following Table.
Low Low High High
education education education education
/  Single /  Married /  Single /  Married
Min Wage .167 .068 .335 .178
#  of obs. 6 76 2 71
2nd Step
I estimate the wage offer location parameter, A, under the assumption
that
A =  exp(Ao +  A i education)
using the fact that observed wages are distributed with density g(w) given by
g(wi) =  Aexp(—A(iUi -  w*))
where w* is the observed minimum wage for individual i (according to education 
and marital status). However, in practice, my results were almost identical when 
I used only education as a class variable.
3rd Step
I use a larger sample of young women (sample is used in Belzil and 
Hergel,1995) who had only one interruption and whom have not yet been back 
to work. For these young women, wages are recorded at survey time so I can 
estimate the effects of experience under the assumption that
A =  exp(Ao +  Ai education + X2 experience)
using the same reservation wages and the same parameter estimates (Ao and 
Ai) obtained in step 2. The final estimates are Ao =  1.7422, Ai =  —.0332 
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